Housing finance aspects of the green paper by Hills, John & Marsh, Alex
Housing Finance Aspects of the
Green Paper
Edited by Alex Marsh and John Hills
December 2000
ii
Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion
The ESRC Research Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion (CASE) was established in
October 1997 with funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. It is located
within the Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines
(STICERD) at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and benefits from
support from STICERD. It is directed by Howard Glennerster, John Hills, Kathleen Kiernan,
Julian Le Grand, Anne Power and Carol Propper.
Our Discussion Paper series is available free of charge. We also produce summaries of our
research in CASEbriefs, and reports from various conferences and activities in CASEreports.
To subscribe to the CASEpaper series, or for further information on the work of the Centre
and our seminar series, please contact the Centre Administrator, Jane Dickson, on:
Telephone: UK+20 7955 6679
Fax: UK+20 7955 6951
Email: j.dickson@lse.ac.uk
Web site: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/Case
 Alex Marsh
John Hills
All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted
without explicit permission provided that full credit, including  notice, is given to the
source.
iii
Contents
1. Comments on Chapter 4: Encouraging Sustainable Homeownership 1
Janet Ford
2. Promoting a healthy private rented sector:
Chapter 5 of Quality and Choice 5
Alex Marsh
3. Poor housing in the private sector: A response to the
Housing Green Paper 14
Philip Leather
4. Housing benefit: Observations on the Housing Green Paper 18
Peter Kemp
5. Large Scale Voluntary Transfer and Arms-Length
Management Companies 24
Bruce Walker
6. Reforming social housing rents 28
Steve Wilcox
7. Subsidy Implications of the Green Paper 33
John Hills
8. Concluding discussion 36
iv
Foreword
This report contains key points from presentations and discussions at a round table meeting
held at the London School of Economics on Monday 24th July 2000. This meeting was
organized by CASE and the University of Bristol to give an opportunity for housing finance
academics to discuss with officials of the Department of the Environment, Transport and the
Regions the financial aspects of the Housing Green Paper, Quality and Choice: A decent
home for all (DETR/DSS, April 2000).
vPapers presented by:
Janet Ford, Centre for Housing Policy, University of York
John Hills, Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, London School of Economics
Philip Leather, Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, University of Birmingham
Peter Kemp, Department of Urban Studies, University of Glasgow
Alex Marsh, School for Policy Studies, University of Bristol
Bruce Walker, Institute of Local Government Studies, University of Birmingham
Steve Wilcox, Centre for Housing Policy, University of York
Participants from the Department of the Environment, Transport and the
Regions:
Hilary Chipping
George Clark
Philip Cox
Richard Horsman
Martin Jones
Anne Kirkham
Judith Littlewood
1. Comments on Chapter 4: Encouraging Sustainable Homeownership
Janet Ford, Centre for Housing Policy, University of York
Introduction
Chapter 4 of the Green Paper sets out a number of key policy initiatives designed to
encourage and support sustainable home ownership. While there is no explicit discussion of
the context, much of the Chapter is clearly predicated on an acceptance of the changing
structure of the housing market and the conditions under which homeownership has now to
be managed. The key policy areas identified (excluding policy towards improving quality)
are:
• protection for homeowners in temporary financial difficulties
• safeguards with respect to the mortgage selling process
• improvements to the home buying and selling process
• low-income access
• leasehold reform.
In many of these areas the Green Paper confirms the nature and direction of existing policies.
Typically, proposals for further initiatives are framed within current assumptions and
parameters (the emphasis on private welfare markets, individual responsibility, the co-
operation of lending institutions, the appropriateness and effectiveness of current structures of
consumer regulation etc). In the context of the Green Paper as a whole, the discussion of
homeownership lacks any of the sense of change that characterises discussion of some other
issues. However, this is not to say that policy towards home ownership as set out in the Green
Paper is unproblematic. This can be illustrated by a focus on two of the policy areas noted
above.
Protection for homeowners in temporary financial difficulties
This policy objective is to be met in two ways; encouraging the provision of more flexible
mortgages and by private market insurance for mortgage payments (MPPI) in the event of a
complete loss of income.
The Green Paper presents the development of flexible mortgages as unproblematic, despite
the lack of any evidence base to support this view. ‘Flexible mortgages’ is a potent marketing
term. The current growth is a result of both truly innovative products (for example, current
account mortgages) and the re-branding of existing products with minimal changes –
typically short payment holidays or a switch to monthly or daily interest calculations).
Important issues are:
• Which aspects of flexibility are able to contribute to the aim of sustainable home
ownership? What proportion of flexible mortgages offer the facility to overpay or a
payment holiday and what proportion of those with flexible mortgages have the capacity
to overpay? Which segments of home owners are taking flexible mortgages?
• The relationship between flexible mortgages with the current social security safety-net.
For example, flexible mortgages are characterised by rapidly fluctuating outstanding
interest while ISMI makes an assumption of stability. The capacity of borrowers or
lenders with a current account mortgage to identify the outstanding mortgage balance on
2the original mortgage (which becomes a redundant term) is also questionable. Flexible
mortgages may also contribute to the problem of payment difficulties rather than to their
solution by facilitating additional borrowing.
The second policy towards protecting mortgagors in financial difficulties is through the
provision of MPPI. The Green Paper acknowledges a number of problems with the MPPI
market (cost, take-up, etc.) but suggests that they are amenable to solution, not least through
the benchmark product. The Green Paper implicitly endorses the achievement of the
proposed take-up rate of 55%. The research evidence questions many of these assumptions
raising some key issues about this policy reliance on MPPI. These include:
• Whether key risks are insurable by the private market? In particular, is unemployment
insurable? Can the product respond to the terms and conditions that pertain in a flexible
labour market?
• While the bench mark product has increased transparency is it primarily confirming
minimum standards? If so, how can product innovation be addressed?
• What are the mechanisms for increasing market penetration? (currently 19%). What
leverage can Government exert? A key issue for discussion is the need for compulsory
MPPI with the insurance forming an integral part of the mortgage product.
The Green Paper also puts forward three possible longer term proposals as options; to offer
ISMI at 2 months to homeowners with MPPI but who suffer an uninsurable event and to
allow more generous treatment of MPPI in assessing benefit entitlement. Either or both of
these could make an immediate, significant contribution to the better protection of
mortgagors. The third proposal to align MPPI and ISMI more effectively by extending the
ISMI wait period to 14 months has to be predicated on both much wider take-up of MPPI and
early access to ISMI for uninsurable events. Without these conditions in place, the extension
of the wait period is likely to encourage rapid possession of uninsured borrowers. Such a
proposal would, however, have the benefit of removing the current administrative difficulties
associated with ISMI/MPPI overlap. This proposal raises the issue of regulating lenders with
respect to initial forbearance. Experience in the early 1990s suggest that voluntary
agreements are inadequate. Currently, forbearance is inadequately covered in the Mortgage
Code.
The Green Paper proposes two changes to the State support for mortgagors (ISMI).
• An extension of the linking arrangements from 13 to 52 weeks which addresses the
disincentive mortgagors face in taking casual temporary work.
• An ISMI run-on of 4 weeks on a return to work which is likely to limit the risk of arrears.
Both are positive developments addressing well documented disincentives to a return to
work. Significantly, this is the first step towards equalising the treatment of low income
mortgagors and tenants with respect to support with housing costs. However, overall, the
Green Paper leaves as an unaddressed, major, issue the full implementation of a tenure
neutral housing allowance scheme that would effectively underpin low income
homeownership. This is one of the major outstanding issues within home ownership policy.
Without this, and in the light of the comments above, the current level of homeownership
may be unsustainable.
3Safeguards in the mortgage selling process
The Green Paper identifies consumer detriment in the mortgage selling process associated
with the lack of transparency and non-comparability of mortgage information. It aims to
address this problem by building on, but replacing, the voluntary Mortgage Code regulation
by the introduction of statutory regulation of the mortgage selling process where the FSA will
supervise compliance with the requirement for clear and open disclosure. Kite marked
mortgages are also proposed, conforming to CAT standards.
Statutory regulation is to be welcomed, not least because of the evidence that the voluntary
Mortgage Code offers relatively weak regulation and is characterised by considerable non-
compliance. These proposals for statutory regulation while important are, nevertheless,
partial and a key issue is the direct exclusion from this framework of the selling activities of
mortgage intermediaries and of the provision of mortgage advice. Under the new regulatory
system, lenders are to be held responsible for the selling of their products by intermediaries
(complicating the structures of compliance and potentially reducing the number of mortgage
intermediaries as lenders seek to reduce the effort in monitoring). The absence of regulation
of mortgage advice reflects the assumption that mortgage products are straightforward and
that once borrowers have clear information, robust and appropriate decisions can be made.
This is the caveat emptor principle that governs all consumer regulation and that has not to
date prevented mis-selling. Research questions the assumption that mortgages are
straightforward, identifies the limited financial literacy amongst many consumers and
indicates the widespread reliance on mortgage advice. Thus, while a start is outlined in the
Green Paper, any policy to bring about a substantial reduction in consumer detriment is likely
to require a more comprehensive form of regulation than is proposed in the Green Paper.
Support for low income entry to homeownership
The Green Paper suggests continuing support for the entry of low income households into
home ownership through Right-to-Buy and other low cost schemes. In the light of the current
figures on mortgage arrears and level of payment difficulties, and the evidence that more
low-income households are leaving owner occupation than entering, such encouragement to
entry should be questioned. In addition, the Starter Home Initiative responding specifically to
the issue of low-income, key worker demand in high price areas is problematic. The criteria
for such initiatives look robust and, for example, there is a question as to whether the house
prices in the bottom quartile in some local housing markets can be afforded by those on low
incomes or by households with only one earner. Further, such initiatives may be redundant as
the price/income/location relationships shift over time.
Brief Summary
The commitment to home ownership remains central to housing policy. However, the current
level of homeownership is questionable as are the key policies towards safety-net provision.
In this context, the lack of a tenure neutral housing allowance is a critical issue.
4Key points from the discussion of low income home ownership
• Is it realistic to think that MPPI coverage could reach 55%? Even if it did, would it be
offering value for money? Strong scepticism was expressed about this aim, rather than
accepting that there are people for whom home ownership is not sustainable.
• How could the ‘uninsurable events’ which ISMI would cover early on be defined? Could
risks be separated like this, given the way in which short-term policies did not, in fact,
cover against general increases in unemployment risks?
• Further, evidence suggested that cuts in ISMI had not, in fact, incentivised purchase of
MPPI. Instead there was a large group of people without coverage.
• The Government’s aim was to encourage home ownership, in line with aspirations, but
purchasers should recognise the risks they were taking. State protection might be
supporting lenders, not borrowers. However, it was suggested that there was then a
problem in encouraging people into something which was unsustainable and into thinking
that the risks could be removed.
• The ‘Starter Homes’ initiative was still quite open in the form it would take. There would
be a challenge fund into which local authorities would put bids. These could include
existing forms of low cost home ownership.
52. Promoting a healthy private rented sector: Chapter 5 of Quality and
Choice
Alex Marsh, School for Policy Studies, University of Bristol
Introduction
Chapter 5 of the Green Paper covers a range of topics relating to the private rented sector, but
the focus is on expansion of the sector and improvement in the quality of both the stock and
housing management. The key to expansion is seen to be encouraging the involvement of
large private institutional investors. A number of mechanisms are seen as contributing to
improvements in quality, but perhaps the most novel proposal is the possibility of making
Housing Benefit payments, in particular circumstances, contingent upon quality.
In this note I want to make some comments under four headings:
• Clarifying basic assumptions
• Encouraging investment
• The use of Housing Benefit to improve standards
• Voluntary regulation, self regulation and licensing
Clarifying basic assumptions
The chapter’s opening discussion notes the relatively small scale of the private rented sector
in the UK and that it is an easy access tenure for the young and the mobile. These are
conventionally seen as households that are not ready to enter home ownership, or for whom
home ownership does not make sense at the current time, given transaction costs. This leads
the government to the view that not only is a better quality and better managed private rented
sector desirable but also that it should be larger than it is at present (para 5.7).
It is important to recognise that this is a partial picture of the private rented sector. It omits
the ‘life time’ renters who remain in the sector from the time when private rented was a
majority tenure, often in regulated tenancies. Perhaps more significantly it seems to de-
emphasise those who are unable to access other tenures because of inadequate or unstable
incomes or because they are not eligible for – or, increasingly, because they have been
excluded from – social housing. Because all these groups rent privately in largely unrelated
submarkets it is now conventional to note that ‘the’ private rented sector is a largely artificial
construct.
For current purposes this is significant because if policy makers wish to set some objective,
or have some aspiration, regarding the size of the private rented sector then it is necessary to
disentangle the various components of the picture and determine in which sub-market growth
is desirable. In this respect it would be helpful to distinguish between stocks and flows more
clearly. The stock of private dwellings may be relatively small at present, but is it undesirably
small? It most probably depends on which part of the sector we are concerned with. Given
the temporary nature of the demand for private renting from mobile households, it may be the
case that the stock does not need to be extensive nor expand dramatically to meet demand in
particular localities.
6If we examine the trends in tenancy type it is clear that the easy access, temporary and
relatively high turnover part of the sector expanded over the mid-1990s (assured shortholds
increased by 41% over the period 1993/94-1997/98, Wilcox, 1999, Table 49). Yet the number
of regulated tenancies declined by 50% over the same period (from 407,000 to 205,000)
which means that the total number of tenancies has not changed dramatically. Given the
composition of the population of regulated tenants it is inevitable that this sub-sector will
continue to decline. It is therefore not clear whether, in aggregate, an increase in the size of
the sector should be either expected or necessary. Similarly, it is clear that there are local
housing markets which exhibit excess supply in the private rented sector – indeed the latter
part of chapter 5 is concerned with such areas. If we assume that in the medium term that
excess supply will decrease while supply in areas of excess demand will increase then again
it is not clear a priori whether one would expect to see an aggregate increase in the stock of
private rented dwellings.
If, however, we accept that an aggregate increase in the size of the private rented sector is
necessary then it must flow from some combination of the assumptions that:
(i) at any one time there will be more mobile households
(ii) that a larger number of households move into the private renting before moving into
owner occupation, or such households postpone for longer (possibly indefinitely) their move
into owner occupation
(iii) there will be a larger pool of households who cannot access one of the other tenures
Which of these assumptions is given primacy is significant when we consider the supply
response because they are largely separate sub-markets. It is clear that the rental yields
available vary spatially. Yields are highest in the smallest properties and, broadly speaking, in
the regions with the less vibrant economies. If mobility is directed towards the more dynamic
local economies – as might be expected – then it may be that the level of house prices –
which largely drives the level of rents – places a constraint on yields and suppresses the
supply response, at least from highly geared small landlords. For households to choose to
remain in the private rented sector when owner occupation is an option (assumption ii) then
clearly the appropriate mix of accommodation needs to be available. Yet, for larger properties
yields are lower and hence the supply response is likely to be more sluggish. If, in contrast,
assumption (iii) predominates then a key factor in the generation of an adequate supply
response will be the future of Housing Benefit, which would not necessarily be an issue for
(i) – if we assume mobility is job-related – or (ii).
One thing that chapter 5 lacks is explicit discussion of the ‘central dilemma’ of the private
rented sector, which is that rents required to generate the yields that make private landlordism
attractive are out of reach of many of those who wish to, or have to, reside in the sector. It is,
of course, implicit in the discussion of encouraging investment in private renting, but that
discussion is conducted entirely with respect to the supply side, without reconnecting to the
demand side of the market.
This issue of finance is a further element in understanding why the UK has a relatively small
private rented sector. The Green Paper identifies perceptions of poor quality stock and
management as generating a poor image – at least partly unjustified – which is an
impediment to the growth of the sector. What it does not acknowledge is that most consumers
perceive it also as poor value. Not so much poor value in the sense that you receive a poor
service for the money you pay, but in comparison with owner occupation. The popular
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purchasing a capital asset and self-provisioning management and maintenance services.
Improving the quality of the stock and management may well enhance the reputation of the
sector and affect decision making for some housing consumers, but it does nothing to address
these deeply ingrained views of the relative merits of renting and owning.
Encouraging investment
In terms of encouraging institutional investment in the sector, the government sees creating
an environment of certainty and confidence as the key factor. The chapter raises the
possibility of tax changes to increase the incentives to institutional investors, but there is a
general presumption that there should be no special treatment. The government sees ruling
out both reform of the assured shorthold regime and the reimposition of rent regulation or
control as being an important element of creating an environment of certainty and confidence.
This is typically described as minimising the ‘political risk’ associated with private renting.
But, it could be argued that floating ideas around the change to Housing Benefit (discussed
below) in itself injects another set of risks into landlordism. Moreover, these risks are more
immediate and apparent than the somewhat vague ‘political risks’ that it is argued have
inhibited the growth of the sector. Whether this is important in practice depends on whether it
is the Housing Benefit sub-sector(s) of the private rented sector in which growth is felt
desirable/necessary. This in turn raises the question of the types of individual or organisation
that will be interested in catering for the ‘growth’ sub-sector(s). Implicit in the Green Paper
discussion is the assumption that investors motivated by return on capital will, if they were to
become involved in the private rented sector, wish to provide accommodation for the sub-
sector(s) where growth is seen as desirable/necessary.
We know from existing research (esp. Crook et al, 1995; Crook and Kemp, 1999) that
institutional investors are not interested in getting involved in landlordism on a small scale.
The question then becomes how to get involved on a large scale. Two options present
themselves. First, investors can either buy or provide loans to existing large organisations,
and there appears to be limited enthusiasm for direct ownership. Second, they can postpone
involvement until small organisations grow organically to become large enough to be a
realistic investment proposition. The former option is made difficult by the fact that there are
few large private property management companies. This suggests that the second option is
the more plausible. The problem is that there has been very little thought about the process by
which this desirable end-state is to be achieved. Most small landlords are happy staying
small. Those that go for growth are unusual, entrepreneurial and can adopt relatively risky
strategies. If the government has a desire to see large scale landlordism then there needs to be
some thought to setting in place a framework and a pattern of incentives that will encourage
growth, but not encourage or underwrite incautiously risky expansion strategies.
Encouraging greater involvement in private renting by private institutional investors has been
a policy goal since at least 1980. It would be appropriate to ask whether, by focusing on the
large institutional investor, policy is not perhaps looking in the wrong direction? The recent
comparative work by Bramley et al (1999) suggests that in the countries they studied (USA,
Australia, France and Germany) institutional investment was by no means a dominant feature
of private landlordism. This is the case even though renting in these countries does not suffer
from the image problems that it does in this country. Hence, in this respect at least the UK is
not that far out of line. Is there something about the economic fundamentals or the
8practicalities of private landlordism that means that it is not attractive to large investors? A
further question is whether the presence of the City of London is a help or a hindrance if the
goal is to increase institutional investment in private renting. On the one hand, the
sophistication of the City means that it can pick up on promising investment opportunities
that arise. On the other, the very sophistication of the system and the array of alternative
investment vehicles that is available may make it harder to interest investors in private
renting. One of the reasons for the decline of private renting during the twentieth century was
the emergence of alternative outlets – such as building society accounts – for the small
investor. These meant that money could be invested for a competitive return without the need
to bother with the complexities of housing management. It is possible that we currently face
an analogous situation with respect to large investors.
This isn’t to argue that policy shouldn’t be concerned with interesting large private investors
in private renting. Rather it is to suggest that devoting all attention towards such investors
may be misplaced. On the one hand, in most developed economies it is the small landlord that
predominates. How small investors either individually or in concert can be encouraged to
make long term investments in the sector remains an important question. On the other hand, it
may be that there are alternative routes to large scale private landlordism. Registered social
landlords are identified in the Green Paper as ‘obvious candidates’ for providing low cost
management services to small landlords and the government will seek to open a dialogue on
the possibilities (para 5.15). Might they not be the obvious candidates to offer large scale
market renting also? Large RSLs could offer the possibility of developing a geographically
diversified portfolio of market rented properties, have the necessary expertise, be of sufficient
scale to offer a realistic proposition for attracting finance by private investors and have the
‘back office’ infrastructure in place to take advantage of economies of scale in
administration. It might be the case that the ‘front office’ would be branded differently so that
it does not appear to be ‘social housing’ and there would need to be some thought as to how
such activities would link to core activities within the purview of Housing Corporation
regulation. Nonetheless, it seems a route worth exploring further.
The use of Housing Benefit to improve standards
The Green Paper proposes some novel uses of Housing Benefit in pursuit of higher quality. It
is justified in being cautious about a general proposal to make Housing Benefit conditional on
the landlord providing a decent quality property and management (paras 5.39-5.40). But it
raises a number of options for using Housing Benefit payments to influence standards. These
are:
• To restrict Housing Benefit payments in respect of poor housing in areas where the
market is over-supplied and claimants would have little difficulty finding a suitable
alternative (para 5.41)
• To make direct payments to the landlord contingent upon the landlord meeting acceptable
standards of provision and management (para 5.44)
• To make Housing Benefit payments contingent upon the tenant not engaging in anti-
social behaviour (para 5.46-5.47)
I do not propose to consider all the dimensions of these proposals but it is necessary to
examine the question of the incentives that they create and the behavioural responses that we
might expect from landlords.
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problem of claimants living in unsatisfactory homes in areas of high demand’ (para 5.43).
This seems an important omission. One could argue that if ‘claimants have little difficulty in
finding alternative homes of a fit standard’ in a particular locality then there is little need for
a scheme of the type proposed: tenants can effectively exercise the exit option to discipline
landlords. This presupposes that the alternative better quality accommodation would be
affordable and not fall foul of the Housing Benefit rules. An area in which the excess supply
comprises poor quality accommodation is a separate issue, and one not addressed by the
Green Paper. In contrast, it is in areas of excess demand, where alternative accommodation is
hard to find, that raising the standard of the poor stock is more important because landlords
can persist in providing poor accommodation with impunity.
Turning to the question of incentives and behavioural responses, the first option rests upon
the view that landlords offering poor quality properties will allow a restriction in Housing
Benefit to be translated into a reduction in the rent payable. It is necessary to think through
how such a system might work. If a tenant takes up a tenancy and subsequently finds that
Housing Benefit has been restricted – or even denied (para 5.42) – because the dwelling is of
poor quality or the landlord unlicensed, what is the tenant to do? They have effectively
committed themselves to a six month assured shorthold. If they leave before six months they
are still liable for six months rent. It is presumably not the government’s intention to
implement a policy integral to which is the tenant breaking their contractual agreement. This
implies that they have to remain in the tenancy for at least six months and cover some or all
of the rent from their own pocket. An alternative would be to compel landlords to declare
themselves as having been excluded from or sanctioned by the Housing Benefit system
before the tenant agrees to the take on a tenancy. This would mean the tenant could make an
informed choice.
The LRC’s (1999) examination of the impact of the Single Room Rent and Local Reference
Rents noted that landlords considered it the tenant’s responsibility to pay the rent. Tenants
would be expected to make up the shortfall from their income or to borrow the money.
Alternatively the landlord might take any shortfall from the tenant’s deposit at the end of the
tenancy. This brings with it the possibility that the tenant would not be able to secure future
private rented accommodation and consequently find him/herself homeless. This suggests
that the government’s proposal for a third party deposit holding scheme (paras 5.16-5.17) is
an important complement to any strategy involving restrictions in Housing Benefit.
The other possibility is that the shortfall in rent results in eviction (whether lawful or
unlawful) and harassment. Shortfalls in rent have been identified as one of the most important
causes of this type of landlord behaviour (Marsh et al, 2000). In sum, in pursuit of the bad
landlord, this first option is likely to impose considerable costs upon tenants.
While the growth of direct payments of Housing Benefit to landlords may be seen as
undesirable, we need to consider how landlords view such payments. If they see them as
effectively reducing the risk attached to renting to tenants who depend on Housing Benefit
then one might expect that removing rent direct could lead to upward pressure on rents in
order to embody both a risk premium and additional administration costs. Alternatively, it
may result in a reduction in supply to this segment of the market because the perceived risk
of default, and consequent disrupted cash flow, is so great as to be unacceptable.
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The third option – making Housing Benefit or the method of its payment contingent upon the
tenant’s good behaviour – will arguably have the same effect. There is a strong feeling among
landlords – including the good ones – that they are property managers: they are not social
workers or hand-holders for their tenants. Housing Benefit reclaims from the landlord
because a tenant has failed to declare their circumstances accurately are considered to be
iniquitous precisely because they are seen as penalising an innocent party. Landlords are also
constrained by law regarding the extent to which they can intervene in their tenants’ affairs
without leaving themselves open to charges of harassment. Moreover, anti-social behaviour
by tenants is a key trigger for unlawful eviction because it is felt that due process is too slow
to deal with it effectively (Marsh et al, 2000). To expect landlords to supervise the
‘rehabilitation’ of tenants and to accept reduced rent in the process seems implausible. If
landlords face the prospect of being penalised for the anti-social behaviour of tenants on
Housing Benefit then many will either expect a considerable risk premium or exit the
Housing Benefit market.
Voluntary regulation, self regulation and licensing
The Green Paper makes it clear that the government favours voluntary over statutory
regulation and that licensing will largely be restricted to the HMO sub-sector. It also takes a
positive view of the Law Commission’s proposal that a new lease should carry with it the
requirement that the dwelling be fit on first, and all subsequent, lettings.
Comprehensive licensing is ruled out as follows: ‘Licensing the whole sector – over 10% of
our entire housing stock – would be a massive undertaking which would risk collapsing under
its own weight, not least as a great many homes enter and leave the private rented sector each
year. The extra red tape involved would also be likely to encourage some perfectly
respectable landlords to leave the business altogether and to dissuade others from joining it’
(para 5.31). The Green Paper then proceeds to outline the case for limited licensing in
particular localities.
There are three points that are worth making at this point. First, while the notion that a lease
should carry with it the implication that the property is fit is no doubt welcome, the idea that
this ‘would provide tenants with a new opportunity to take action against delinquent
landlords’ (para 5.29) needs to be treated with caution. It may provide such an opportunity,
but tenants’ lack of knowledge of their rights and their perception of their precarious position
with respect to security of tenure are likely to mean that many do not take up this
opportunity: they will either simply move to another dwelling or, in areas of excess demand,
stay put and put up with the problem. This is one of the messages that emerged strongly from
the research on harassment and unlawful eviction (Marsh et al, 2000).
Second, also emerging from the harassment research was the view that local accreditation
schemes and industry-led regulation, while potentially useful, can lack either the carrot or the
stick needed to guarantee quality or encourage quality improvements. They are likely to be
most effective where local market conditions mean that landlords can comply and still realise
an adequate return on their investment. Some landlords who are part of local accreditation
schemes were apparently ignorant of their legal obligations. Some of those in landlords’
associations – who would most likely be considered "good and well-intentioned landlords" in
the Green Paper’s terms – admit to engaging in acts, often consciously, that were either of
doubtful legality or were clearly unlawful. The government’s better regulation guidelines
may start with a preference for voluntary or self regulation, but it would perhaps be useful to
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investigate more responsive and nuanced regulatory strategies as proposed by, for example,
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992). Their ‘benign big gun’ model of regulation suggests that for
voluntary and self-regulation to be effective it needs to be backed up with the threat that
regulatory pressure will be increased and the process formalised if self-regulation does not
deliver. That threat may rarely be invoked but it nonetheless focuses the minds of those being
regulated.
Finally, it is difficult to see how licensing per se can be ruled out because the burden of ‘red
tape’ and administration depends on the details of the system in place. Clearly some systems
of frequent inspection and monitoring will place a burden upon landlords. Yet, it is possible
to envisage a range of other systems, including those based largely on self-certification, with
lower costs of compliance and administration.
For example, it would be possible to set up a system requiring all landlords to possess a
license to operate, but that license is granted without the requirement for checks on the
property or management standards for first time landlords. Hence, the presumption is that the
landlord is well-intentioned. The license could be purchased periodically, like a TV license,
from a Post Office or from the local authority (who would keep a record of licenses
withdrawn/suspended). A landlord would require only one license to cover all their
properties. A copy of the license could be required to be shown to tenants before they take up
their tenancy and could be required as a component of all applications for Housing Benefit by
any one of the landlord’s tenants (which is similar to some of the Green Paper proposals).
Alternatively, one could require a copy of the license to be submitted alongside the annual tax
return. This would act as a counter to any landlord’s claim that they did not know that they
needed a license. (If a landlord had been renting property for more than a year then the only
way they could not know about licensing would be if they were not declaring their rental
income.)
A license would only be withdrawn or suspended if it becomes apparent that a landlord’s
properties are substandard or dangerous or if they engage in harassment or other unlawful
behaviour. Clear guidance from central government would need to be issued to ensure that
those charged with implementing the regime apply the rules equitably. As with driving,
operating without a valid license would be an offence. If we consider that removing the
option of landlordism is too severe a penalty, then it could be that the landlord who has
his/her license withdrawn/suspended could retain ownership but would have to place the
properties in the management of a professionally recognised agent, perhaps for a finite
period. The landlord would then incur a financial penalty (the management fee) and tenants’
quality of life would be improved. The thrust of such a system would be that as long as
landlords lawfully provide an adequate service they would only incur a low cost. Such as
system would be no more burdensome on the individual landlord than arranging for their car
to be taxed or TV licensed.
The fact that at present even when convicted of unlawful behaviour a landlord cannot be
disqualified from continuing as a landlord signals that undesirable behaviour in this field is
not a serious issue. Some system that imposes a minimal burden on most landlords, but can
effectively exclude the bad landlord seems essential if the government’s goals for the sector
are to be realised. Systems of voluntary or self regulation alone are not backed up with the
necessary force.
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Key points from the discussion of the private rented sector
• Private inventors want a ‘level playing field’, especially in tax terms. In particular
pension funds wanted a form of investment which was tax-free, which was not possible if
they invested via a property company rather than owning directly.
• Could quite radical measures be considered, including more general exemption of the
PRS from tax? Were significant amounts actually being collected under current
arrangements?
• Depreciation allowances were a further issue. Other countries with more active private
rented sectors had these, for which there were logical grounds in any case.
• Social landlords could prove the route through which a larger private rented sector grew,
for instance with market renting of some of their properties.
• There were dangers in making private renting too attractive in that this could fuel
household growth and end up pushing poorer people into worse areas.
• Concentration on institutional investors has meant that we have ignored the potential of
small investors with just a few properties – although such properties might quickly leave
the market. There was a gap in the research base here.
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3. Poor housing in the private sector: a response to the Housing Green
Paper
Philip Leather, Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, University of
Birmingham
The Housing Green Paper deals with private sector housing conditions within the framework
of sustainable home ownership (Chapter 4). It is good to see the government noting that
repair and improvement costs are significant issues in relation to affordability and
sustainability in the owner occupied sector. In particular the recognition of the repair and
maintenance problems faced by some right to buy purchasers is long overdue.
By and large the Green Paper’s proposals in relation to housing renewal policy are to be
welcomed. They aim to deliver more local flexibility and freedom and to remove obstacles to
new approaches which are designed in enable more private investment in repair and
improvement. The main concern is whether a more radical set of changes are required. These
comments recognise the value of the proposals which the Green Paper makes and make
suggestions for taking these forward, but they also point out ways in which the government
should be looking for a broader reform of the policy framework.
The Green Paper rightly points out that all those who buy have an obligation to ensure, as far
as possible, that they take the costs of repair into account when assessing their own ability to
buy. It also supports initiatives to educate and inform owners about repair costs. But it must
also be recognised that some people may suffer unpredictable changes in their circumstances
and these people will still need help. In addition, there is a very large group of low income
home owners (including some older people and people who purchased under right to buy)
who bought at a time when governments were less concerned to point out the need to plan for
long term repair costs and more concerned to promote entry to home ownership irrespective
of sustainability. It would be unacceptable to leave this group without assistance in meeting
repair costs which they cannot afford.
Not all problems with housing conditions stem from resources, as the Paper points out. Fear
of cowboy builders, poor workmanship and disruption are major factors. The Quality Mark
initiative is a welcome response to this. Lessons from the pilots should be absorbed as soon
as possible and the scheme should be rolled out to give nationwide coverage. But one
problem with the scheme and with similar initiatives is that it does not do anything to
increase the overall supply of competent builders. As well as applying tighter controls of the
industry, there is a need for improved training to improve the supply of good builders.
Without this, schemes to vet builders are simply fighting amongst themselves and many good
builders do not join schemes because there is no need for them to do so. Training to improve
the supply of builders needs to cover the skills required to run a business efficiently, and the
skills needed to work with customers in their homes – service industry skills as much as
construction skills. These are as important as technical skills in the small-scale domestic
repair and maintenance sector. Although the industry could take responsibility for such
improvement in the long term, it is likely, as with Quality Mark, that the government will
need to kick start any improvements with encouragement and funding.
The Green Paper stresses the need to educate home owners about the need to keep up with
repairs and maintenance and the benefits of practical initiatives (such as home improvement
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agencies or Urban Care schemes). DETR has already funded research to evaluate these
schemes and to commend them to local authorities. A welcome further boost to the funding
for home improvement agencies was provided in the recent Comprehensive Spending
Review. But progress in expanding general advice services like Urban Care has stalled,
because of the revenue costs associated with these schemes. Information and advice cannot
be self financing, and is rarely fee generating, but the balance of evidence is that it pays for
itself in preventative terms by inducing additional expenditure by home owners from their
own resources. The government should consider how it can help local authorities and other
providers to expand the availability of Urban Care type schemes, for example by relaxing
rules on funding mechanisms to allow the use of capital as well as revenue resources.
The proposal to produce an index of typical repair costs will be useful. No doubt there are
many practical difficulties in doing this and many qualifications to the data, but the index will
still be of general value to those who do wish to take a prudent forward planning approach to
meeting repair costs. It will be as important to ensure that the data is regularly updated and
widely disseminated as to get the figures right technically.
The Green Paper sets out two important aims in relation to public finance for private sector
renewal. The first is to use these resources more strategically and effectively by allowing
local authorities more scope to tailor policies and mechanisms to their own circumstances.
This is a long overdue reform. Given the variations in housing conditions and in housing
markets across the country, it is anomalous that a uniform framework of policies and
instruments should be in use across all localities.
Secondly, local authorities and their partners are prevented from developing effective
strategies by the restrictions on their freedom to act appropriately. The recent burst of interest
in developing alternative sources of private funding to repair work has revealed the extent to
which authorities are hamstrung by regulations and restrictions which sometimes defy all
their ingenuity. It would be far better to enable authorities to be innovative and to develop
local policies for which they could take responsibility. The measures which the paper
suggests to give greater discretion on helping owners with repair and maintenance should be
introduced as quickly as possible. Indeed the paper refers to more discretion over grants, but
it would be better to give even more freedom by allowing other approaches to feeding public
money into renovation – for example equity loans, repayable loans, revenue payments to
meet loan debt charges, or subsidies to reduce loan set-up costs.
Despite these welcome proposals, which will give more flexibility and draw in more private
resources to tackle disrepair, and its recognition that some owners will always need help with
repair work, the Green Paper does not really address the question of who should receive help
and the scope of that help. What is absent is a rationale to determine when public money will
be made available and for what. Whilst this is politically difficult, it is an essential pre-
requisite if owners are to be clear what their responsibilities are and what help they can
expect to receive. This clarity is exactly what the present system lacks.
Realistically, if public resources are to be used more effectively and to help more people,
whilst at the same time drawing in more private money, the role of state funding needs to
change:
• We need a tighter rationale for public spending, probably focusing mainly on health and
safety issues – to support work which endangers health for example.
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• Although this may not offer long term value for money, work funded by public resources
needs to be more orientated towards shorter term and lower cost solutions which enable
more people to be helped – person rather than property-based solutions.
• Mechanisms may have to be less generous – repayable loans, equity loans, or grant on
loan interest rather than capital grants. Options which enable resources to be recycled
should be explored.
• As a last resort, it must be recognised that some owners cannot afford to sustain
themselves as home owners without frequent inputs of state aid and in these cases it may
be better to offer options which enable them to change into rented tenure – whilst staying
put.
Most of these comments have focused on housing repair problems which stem largely from
individual problems – the inability of low income home owners to afford repairs, or an
unwillingness to tackle these problems for other reasons. Such problems are likely to increase
as the population ages and as social relationships and employment become less stable. They
are often scattered in their incidence. But there is increasing evidence that in some areas
concentrations of poor housing are emerging – especially in the inner areas of northern and
midlands cities. Poor conditions in these areas are compounded by problems of market failure
and weak demand. Area-based housing renewal mechanisms (such as Housing Action Areas
and more recently Renewal Areas) have been used to tackle these problems. Some Renewal
Areas have been successful but, increasingly, local authorities are cautious about declaring
them because there are no mechanisms to guarantee to necessary ten year resource streams
which declarations imply.
The Green Paper proposes minor changes to the Renewal Area concept to make declaration
more straightforward, but it is questionable whether this is the best approach. Evidence from
areas where market failure is occurring in the private sector suggests that poor housing
conditions are only part of a broader need for regeneration – and indeed they may not be the
main priority for action. Dealing with crime, improving the environment, empowering the
community, and creating jobs or reviving businesses are the important first steps. Where
housing improvement is required, this is best undertaken within the framework of a wider
regeneration initiative (such as SRB or New Deal) which can go further in offering the
necessary level of resources for housing renovation over the required long term timescale. In
other words area-based housing renewal would be better set in the context of broader
regeneration policies than relying on the Renewal Area mechanism – which can deliver some
housing investment but often lacks any broader regeneration programme.
17
Key points from the discussion of stock renewal
• The Green Paper had explored options other than grants, but it was hard to get the balance
right on how much should go through loans.
• There was a fundamental issue about the level of help to low income owners with repair
costs, by contrast with the help to tenants through Housing Benefit, which covers
equivalent costs.
• Half of those on low incomes are owners, but their support has been marginalised as an
issue.
• The move to a ‘single capital pot’ would allow local authorities more flexibility in
supporting stock renewal. What will be interesting is what will be left for home owners
after the size of the needs of the social sector is clarified through the new major repair
allowance.
• The current system does not allocate the resources efficiently – i.e. it is done grant by
grant rather than strategically.
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4. Housing Benefit: Observations on the Housing Green Paper
Peter A Kemp, Department of Urban Studies, University of Glasgow
Introduction
The chapter dealing with Housing Benefit has been described as one of the ‘greenest’ parts of
the Housing Green Paper. Although the Government admits it has “inherited a fragmented,
confused and failing Housing Benefit system” (DETR and DSS, 2000, para 11.49), it is not
always very clear what action or changes will be put in place to tackle these problems. The
chapter is very tentative in tone and barely of sufficient colour to qualify as a ‘Green Paper’
in the traditionally accepted sense.
The Green Paper describes some of the initiatives that have already been introduced or are
being developed, such as the use of remote access terminals and electronic transfer of
documents. It also sets out some possible reforms that might help to simplify the scheme or
otherwise improve administration, tackle fraud and improve work incentives. However, it is
not clear which, if any, of these possible reforms are likely to be introduced. Indeed, the
Green Paper stresses the risks and costs of such changes as much as it does the benefits that
might result from them. Some fundamental reforms are discussed but the possibility of
introducing any of them has been deferred for a decade until social housing rents have been
re-structured.
In effect, the Housing Benefit chapter of the Green Paper is more of a discussion document
than an outline of intentions. Perhaps that is as it should be, for it gives the various
stakeholders, think tanks, academics, private individuals and others the opportunity to be
consulted; presented with ideas for debate, rather than proposals set in concrete that are
unlikely to be changed all that much. Widespread agreement about how Housing Benefit
should be reformed is probably necessary in order to implement successful, lasting reforms to
the scheme.
Problems with Housing Benefit
The Green Paper sets out a formidable list of problems that “we need to tackle in order to
modernise welfare and housing” (DETR and DSS, 2000, para 11.5). In summary, these
problems are:
• The delivery of Housing Benefit is complex, confusing and time consuming
• The benefit rules are [too] complex
• The performance of local authorities in administering the scheme is inconsistent
• The administrative hassle and delay can leave claimants with rent arrears or at risk of
eviction
• Fraud and error in the Housing Benefit system costs an estimated £840m each year
• Housing Benefit can act as a barrier which deters people of working age from getting into
jobs
• Landlords can exploit the system
• Housing Benefit takes away responsibility from claimants and gives them little interest in
the rent
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Solutions and dilemmas
In order to tackle these problems, the Green Paper describes a number of initiatives that the
Government has already introduced, is developing or is in the process of introducing. Other
possible reforms that might help to deal with these problems are also discussed. Most of the
existing or possible reforms are likely to help ameliorate these problems, though none is
without difficulties or risks. Such changes as the introduction of a single claims process, a
national claim form, and greater information sharing between the different agencies involved
in the administration of the scheme, could potentially help to improve the delivery of
Housing Benefit.
However, these relatively modest changes are at best likely to make relatively modest (if
worthwhile) improvements to the scheme. They are unlikely to transform the administration
of Housing Benefit and substantially remove the problems outlined in the Green Paper.
Although the scheme will be somewhat less complex as a result of changes such as these, it
will still be very complex indeed.
And yet it is the very complexity of Housing Benefit that is at the heart of the deep-seated
problems from which it suffers. While the structure of the scheme is relatively simple, the
administrative rules surrounding the definition, identification and verification of the key
variables – resources (income and capital), household composition, tenancy arrangements,
and eligible rent – are highly complex.
The fact that benefit is re-calculated immediately that claimants’ report a change of
circumstances (even where the change is relatively minor) further complicates administration.
As the labour market moves towards more ‘flexible’ employment, tenants are likely to
experience much more frequent changes of circumstances, in contrast to the more stable
forms of employment in the past. These new circumstances raise doubts about whether it is
sustainable to operate a Housing Benefit scheme that is so finely tuned that even quite small
changes of circumstances have to be reported and benefit entitlement re-calculated.
Fixing Housing Benefit awards for set periods of six months (subject to the right for
claimants to request a review) could help to streamline administration and remove some of
the work disincentive effects of the scheme (Kemp, 1998). This idea appears to have wide
support, as the evidence submitted to the House of Commons Social Security Committee’s
Inquiry into Housing Benefit makes clear (Social Security Committee, 2000; see also Hills,
2000).
In the longer term, there may be a case for taking a more broad-brush approach to the rules
governing Housing Benefit and the other main means-tested benefits. This might involve, for
example, taking a more simplified approach to the definition of income. However, an
important reason why entitlement to benefits is so finely calibrated and adjusted in Britain is
because the levels of basic income support benefits (other than Housing Benefit) are
relatively low. To some extent, complexity enables Housing Benefit entitlement to be
adjusted to the precise financial needs of people on very low incomes. A more broad-brush
approach would create financial hardship unless accompanied by more generous benefit
levels. In other words, simplifying the scheme in a way that did not cause undue hardship
would cost a considerable sum of money.
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This dilemma also applies in reduced form to more minor simplifications such as the fixed
period awards mentioned above. Setting Housing Benefit awards for fixed periods would
improve the administration of the scheme. But it would almost certainly increase the cost of
the scheme and could create hardship in some cases, neither of which is appealing to the
Government. The result is that simplification of Housing Benefit is to an extent caught
between a rock and a hard place. Securing substantial improvements in the administration of
Housing Benefit will require simplification, but that it turn will either cost money or create
hardship among people who are by definition already living on a low income.
Fundamental reform
The discussion in the Green Paper about fundamental reform of Housing Benefit centres
mainly on the idea of replacing it with a flat-rate housing allowance as an addition to basic
benefit levels. It would vary by household type and perhaps by area, but take no account of
tenants’ actual housing costs. Such a scheme would be inefficient, paying too much benefit
to some households and not enough to others and therefore “does not look at attractive
option” (para 11.70).
In contrast to the space devoted to this ‘unattractive’ option, only three sentences are given
over to a reform that apparently strikes “a better balance between the risks and gains” (para
11.71). This option would involve tenants making a modest contribution to their rent, with
benefit levels (and applicable amounts in the case of people not receiving income support
benefits) being raised in order to allow them to afford it. Only a paragraph is devoted to the
idea of a housing tax credit (see Wilcox, 1998) and none at all to an innovative scheme
recently suggested by John Hills (2000).
Perhaps the discussion focused on the unattractive option in order to convince readers of the
inadvisability of introducing reforms that give tenants a financial interest in their rent? Either
way, fundamental reform has been ruled out until social housing rents have been re-structured
and allocation policies have been made more flexible. Certainly, it makes little sense to give
social tenants a financial stake in their rent under the present largely incoherent rent regimes
and relatively inflexible allocation and transfer systems. However, that does not mean that
reform to Housing Benefit could not or should not be introduced for private tenants.
The fact that Housing Benefit gives tenants little interest in their rent is a more serious
problem in the private rented sector than in social housing because rents there are set by the
interaction of supply and demand. There is a potential moral hazard problem of private
landlords or tenants taking advantage of the fact that Housing Benefit can cover all of the rent
and all of any increase in rent (and reduces in full for any decrease in rent). This has led to
the introduction of a complex array of rent restrictions for claimants with private, deregulated
tenancies.
These numerous restrictions on ‘unreasonable’ rents complicate the administration of the
scheme, making it more difficult and time-consuming for officials to administer and much
harder for claimants to understand. They also result in hundreds of thousands of private
tenants facing a shortfall between their contractual rent and that which local authorities will
take into account for Housing Benefit purposes, which can cause financial hardship (see
Kemp and McLaverty, 1995; Kemp and Rugg, 1998; London Research Centre, 1999). These
shortfalls are not just the result of the local limits for benefit recipients (the local reference
rent and single room rent). They are also the result the other rent restrictions, such as those
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imposed where the rent is deemed to be over the market value or the accommodation is
considered to be overlarge for the claimant’s needs.
An alternative, simpler and more transparent way of solving the moral hazard problem would
therefore be in the interests of private tenants, administrators and private landlords alike. Re-
designing the scheme so that it includes a modest ‘shopping incentive’ for private tenants
could potentially provide that alternative, so long as it is designed in a way that does not
create a shortfall for tenants whose rent is not unreasonably high (see Kemp, 1998; 2000a).
However, the imperative to avoid serious losses for significant numbers of tenants means that
it would cost money to introduce a modest shopping incentive such as this; it could not be
done at nil-cost. But as someone (I forget who) once pointed out, the only no-loser, nil-cost
reform is the status quo. And the status quo is often delays in the processing of claims and
shortfalls arising from rent restrictions, both of which cause difficulties for private tenants
and their landlords.
Conclusion
The problems from which Housing Benefit suffers are deep-seated and will not be easily
resolved. The fact that the scheme interacts with the rest of the social security system,
income taxation, and housing finance; and involves a variety of stakeholders – including low-
income tenants, local authorities, landlords, mortgage lenders, and at least three government
departments (DSS, DETR and HM Treasury) – only adds to the difficulty of reforming the
scheme (Kemp, 2000b). Nevertheless, the problems are so serious that something urgent
needs to be done to tackle the problems outlined in the Housing Green Paper.
Many of the limited or nil cost changes mentioned in the Green Paper could make a real
difference, but perhaps not a sufficient difference to transform the delivery of this benefit to
the four million low-income tenants who rely on it to pay their rent. Making a substantial
difference may require additional resources to be spent in order to introduce even small
changes such as setting benefit awards for a fixed period. It remains to be seen just how
willing or otherwise the Government is to meet this bill or whether Housing Benefit can
really be reformed at little extra cost.
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Key points from the discussion of Housing Benefit
• We have to think through why the Housing Benefit reform debate had gone round and
round in circles. Fundamentally the problems reflected the lack of generosity of other
benefits like Income Support, so help had to be closely tailored to actual costs.
• The long-run outcome could be the creation of some kind of more general housing
allowance, of a fixed size, as part of anti-poverty policy. This could float more people off
HB altogether, as the WFTC has done.
• Policy may become differentiated by age-group, for instance with a different kind of
system run through the new working age agency.
• Although some could be floated off by more generous tax credits, the majority of HB
recipients were still long-term Income Support cases.
• It was suggested that the Green Paper was very weak on even modest short-run reforms,
such as allowing benefit to be fixed for a period, like the six months in WFTC. This year
HB was costing £1.5 billion less than initial spending plans: this should have given the
scope to think more radically.
• While the Government had decided to go first for rent restructuring, this did not mean that
HB reform was off the agenda for the ten years this would take.
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5. Large Scale Voluntary Transfer and Arms-Length Management
Companies
Bruce Walker, INLOGOV, University of Birmingham
1. The Green Paper Chapter 7 essentially takes as its starting point that ‘public
investment is not enough’ (para 7.8) to secure the improvements that Central
Government is seeking. In this note this will be taken as given and hence I won’t raise
issues regarding:
• the ‘appropriate’ level of public expenditure in aggregate
• the priority given to housing relative to other expenditure within that aggregate
2. However, even if the level of public investment was enough the Green Paper indicates
that ‘Simply spending money…is not enough’ (para 7.4) to ensure:
• an increase in the effectiveness of housing investment
• improved management of housing
• expanded tenant participation
3. There is a need for a different organisational and financial framework to deliver this.
Will LSVT policy and proposed Arms Length Management Companies (ALMC)
prove to be the institutional forms that will deliver? First, consider LSVT.
4. The advantage of LSVT is that it operates outside public expenditure regime –
therefore access to potentially greater investment funds raised on market (therefore
efficient?) basis.
Will private investment be increased by LSVT?
5. Evidence to date:
• By definition it has happened otherwise transfers would not have occurred
• Improvements and refurbishment of the stock have happened in the smaller stocks
of housing transferred to date
6. Will this continue? It will be facilitated by Green Paper commitment on overhanging
debt. But does this bring with it the need for DETR intervention? Otherwise, there is
the issue of LA -RSL negotiations over sale value. What are the incentives for local
authorities regarding negotiating the best price for the stock?
7. There are practical issues in larger transfers, such as construction industry’s capacity
for stock improvements. As an illustration:
• The Coventry LSVT and Orbit HA’s (Midlands Region) reaction – both going for
longer term partnering. Reduce costs of tendering/contracting at increasing ‘spot’
market prices due to volume of improvement activity.
• Transferring the DLO? In-house capacity – but don’t normally carry out
refurbishment: also associated with previous landlord’s failure to maintain
property efficiently.
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Will private investment continue to be attracted to LSVTs?
8. Attraction to private investors of financing the purchase and improvement of stock:
• Purchase is at Tenanted Market Value – Present Value of predicted rent income
(under current rules) net of expenditure on repairs and maintenance @ 7% over 30
years
• Lenders’ Valuation is Present Value of rent stream of stock given increased stock
value (and hence rents) through improvements, increased re-let rents and rent
increases outside of the guarantee period supported by HB
• Lender’s ability to take over the stock in case of default, replace management, sell
vacant units (subject to Secretary of State’s permission) and rent streams
supported by HB
• Risks further mitigated by cover and through interest premium. So: LV>TMV
• Do Lenders want ‘control rights’ (Board membership) as well? Currently they
aren’t allowed to – a condition of registration as RSL: don’t seem to want it
anyway.
9. Will there be a long/short run limit to the supply of funds?
• No sign so far – global players or at least players with access to global markets,
but it is a function of the relative attraction of investment, phasing of LSVTs, and
the quality of larger urban stock coming through
• Impact of policy on future of rent increases under HB reform and RPI + 0
10. In this decision HB is crucial as it secures the rent stream from 70% tenants. No plans
for change to HB structure, so not a real problem yet?
11. On the imposition of RPI+0:
• previous/current LSVTs are expected to honour commitments to tenants. The
Green Paper indicates that the government expects to see rent restructuring over
10 years – no explicit mention of convergence.
• new LSVTs are expected to have rent restructuring and convergence over 10 years
built into their business plans. Effects on rent stream, valuation and attractiveness
to lenders? What if after rent guarantee period LSVT rent<other landlords? RPI+0
or RPI+2%? There is uncertainty here.
Will the quality of management be improved by LSVT?
12. Moving from ‘monopoly suppliers…to a greater number of smaller bodies that are
based in or closer to the communities where the homes are transferred’ (para 7.14). As
an example, does the Coventry LSVT constitute ‘a greater number of smaller bodies’?
• Post-transfer there are two organisations in a group structure under ‘Services
Board’ and Joint Finance Committee. Green Paper accepts this type of
organisation as an initial form but must have ‘Capacity to change and split apart’
(para 7.25).
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• The ‘dangers’ of competition – competing on what in future? Funds, priorities for
improvement? RSLs under group structure may have significant differences in
stock quality, improvement programmes and ability to service debt.
13. TUPE and the transfer of culture – are new LSVTs that different in organisational
outlook from the old ‘monopoly suppliers’?
14. Bidding for LSVT stock to increase competition. How will this be packaged? Will
there be regulations to avoid monopoly or favouring local authority bidder while
maintaining viability of the tranches transferred?
15. Are RSLs better managers (‘technically’) than local authorities?
• The performance of the RSL sector has declined in recent years. LSVTs over-
represented among low management costs RSLs. There are many reasons, but
does it imply that local authority management not (relatively) that inefficient?
• Are RSLs better equipped to deliver on regeneration, urban renaissance and
partnership working?
16. Can RSLs be held more accountable for their activities than local authorities?
• Accountable to whom? Tenants’ voice increased.
• Housing Corporation regulation versus DETR Housing BV Framework to
maintain/ensure efficiency and effectiveness? The latter framework is powerful –
the former ??
17. Why regulate LSVTs anyway if they are not spending taxpayers’ money?
The role of ALMCs
18. The incentive for the local authority to create an ALMC are:
• Retains significant control over its stock while concentrating on strategic function
• Retain more of rental income for investment in housing improvements
19. ALMC is a necessary condition for retaining this income as is:
• High score on BVH Indicators and ‘Excellence’ rating in BV Housing Inspection
• Sound financial planning and long term viability through high quality business
plan
20. So are the circumstances under which an ALMC can be created those in which the
local authority is an excellent housing provider whose tenants have voted against (or
at least not – yet – voted for) transfer? Are these the ones we should be worrying
about, in terms of effecting performance improvements?
21. Can/should ALMCs be seen as the equivalent of a DLO under CCT? What will be the
contractual basis for ALMC? This raises a range of principal-agent issues around, for
example, monitoring and the compatibility of objective functions.
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Key points arising from discussion on transfers
• Arms-length management companies (ALMCs) will be free of borrowing control so they
can borrow privately, even though they will remain within the PSBR. While aggregate
totals may be fixed, they will be outside of borrowing controls at the local level.
• The ALMC option should lead local authorities to rethink stock transfer as a strategy but
it depends on the budgets available (both for ALMCs and transfer) under the
Comprehensive Spending Review whether ALMCs are a realistic option for many.
• Depending on the success of ALMCs the Treasury may over time adopt a more relaxed
view of trading activities by local authorities.
• In the short term there is likely to be a hiatus in the transfer programme while there is
uncertainty about rent restructuring and hence business planning.
• Even though some local authorities may be doing as good a job as HAs or ALMCs could
do, it may be that in reality rebranding through transfer to another landlord is likely to be
the most effective way to reduce stigma and regenerate areas.
• The major transfer of the Glasgow housing stock is likely to happen, even though there is
local opposition. If it doesn’t then most likely the whole of Scottish housing policy will
be thrown into question.
• There are two elements to competition in the transfer process. The first is post-transfer
competition between landlords to attract and retain tenants. The second, less well
developed, element is competition to take on the stock in the first place. This second
dimension is a potentially important element of the picture.
• Do ALMCs represent a ‘false hope’ allowing local authorities to forget about the transfer
option and take the view that they can stay as they are and borrow privately?
• Is the ALMC model sustainable? Is it possible/wise that they are free to borrow yet it
counts against public spending? The incentives within this seem undesirable.
• Chapter 7 of the Green Paper is trying to make the point that it isn’t just resources but
how you use them that is important. By presenting options it is asking local authorities to
grapple with the question of how best to act.
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6. Reforming social housing rents1
Steve Wilcox, Centre for Housing Policy, University of York
The 1999 Budget announced a planned housing green paper, with bold proposals to radically
restructure both rents in the council and housing association (RSL) sectors, and the structure
of the UK wide housing benefit scheme. Thirteen months later the green paper that emerged
was far wider in its scope, and duly set out outline proposals for radical rent reforms, but
somewhere along the line the ambition to reform the housing benefit scheme has been lost.
This article will outline and critically review the green paper proposals on rent reform.
All change on rents
The Green Paper sets out three main options for rent policy in the council and RSL sectors,
all of which are based to some extent on capital values, and would operate within a common
context. The policies would apply to both councils and RSLs, and, in principle, would see all
social landlords charging more or less the same levels of rents for similar properties. The
reforms should bring some order to the current relatively chaotic patterns of rents in the two
sectors, where there are systematic differences in the national policies for each sector,
amplified by the varying decisions of individual landlords, both about their aggregate rent
levels, and about how they set the profile of rents across their stock of dwellings.
Putting council and RSL rents on a common footing will involve ‘a measure of convergence’
between the two sectors, which means that in most parts of the country RSL rents will have to
fall relative to council rents. To that end the green paper proposes that, from April 2002,
average rents in the RSL sector should rise in line with RPI, rather than the RPI plus one
policy that has operated over the last few years. Meanwhile average council rents are
proposed at the rate of RPI plus 2%. How long this differential rates of increase will apply to
the two sectors is not made clear in the green paper, partly because the extent of convergence
required will depend on the final decision on the rent policy to be adopted, and how it is to be
implemented.
At the same time it is not proposed to return to a system of direct regulation of rents, as under
the fair rent regime, but rather to leave the responsibility for setting rents on individual
dwellings with each landlord, but within the context of a financial and regulatory regimes that
should see a far greater consistency in local rents levels across both council and RSL
landlords. This is an ambitious project, but there are many detailed questions still to be
resolved about how the new rent policies will be implemented in practice, in which the
decision about which of the three ‘preferred’ rent policies is to be adopted is only one small
part. Moreover whichever rent policy is adopted there will be profound implications for the
future prospects of individual RSLs.
Current rent regimes
The current lack of a coherent rent policy for the council and RSL sectors was examined in
detail in the 1997/98 edition of the Review (1). One of the key underlying differences in
policy over the last decade is that while council rents have been linked to capital values,
1 This paper is an extract from a version of an article entitled “Contrasting Ambitions” that will appear in
the Housing Finance Review, August 2000.
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through the rent policy embedded in the housing subsidy system, RSL rents have been linked
to earnings, through the formula embedded in the Housing Corporation’s grant rate model.
As a result of this discrepancy north-south rent differentials in the council sector have
widened over the last decade, while RSL rent differentials have narrowed.
The differentials in council rents grew rapidly in the early years on the 1990s, and have
subsequently eased back. This is primarily because initially the subsidy rent guidelines were
based exclusively on capital values, while since the mid 1990s they have been based 50% on
capital values, and 50% on earnings. However, it is also partly because differentials in north
south capital values eased back during the course of the 1990s, reversing the excesses of the
late 1980s housing market boom.
Three policy options
The current rent formula in the council housing subsidy system thus provides the basis for
one of the three main rent policy options set out in the Green Paper. A second option is to
reduce the element of rents based on capital values to 30%, and increase the element based on
earnings to 70%. The third option is based on capital values and ‘running costs’.
Papers published by DETR following the Green Paper have thrown a little more light on the
potential implications of the options for rent reform put forward in the Green Paper (2). One
is a summary of the initial work that HACAS undertook for DETR exemplifying the potential
impact of a much wider range of rent policy options for RSLs. Another is a DETR guide for
RSL and council landlords, to allow them to calculate the sort of rents that the three Green
Paper rent options might mean in practice. One key point is that for most RSLs the rent
restructuring proposals will have a far greater impact than the annual RPI formula; and that
their future viability will depend on the interaction between the different components of the
new rent policy framework, rather than any individual factor.
The new rent policies will have a less dramatic impact on councils, given that their subsidy
formula is already linked in part to capital values. The greatest impact is likely to be on those
councils with rents that are substantially higher than the current subsidy guidelines, primarily
as a result of past decisions to fund additional investment directly from rents. The housing
subsidy system will also provide a cushion to allow councils to adjust to the requirements of
the new rent policies. If rent guidelines go up, there will be an offsetting reduction in subsidy;
if rent guidelines go down there will be an offsetting increase.
The three main rent policy options involve an element related to capital values, and an
element related to either earnings or running costs. Two options are based on a combination
of earnings (70% or 50%) and capital values (30% or 50%), with one option based on a
combination of capital values and running costs, in which the running costs element is
expected, on average, to account for just under a half of average rents in the RSL sector.
Devil in the detail
If both the DETR and HACAS papers will inform the debates about rent policy issues during
the Green Paper consultation period, they also reveal the shortcomings of our current
knowledge about the capital values of dwellings in the council and RSL sectors. There are
also many practical steps still to be resolved about how the preferred rent policy option is to
be implemented, and the decisions on those implementation issues will be just as significant
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for many social landlords as the ‘in principle’ decision between the three rent policy options
favoured by the Green Paper.
A central limitation in working through the implications of rent policies based on capital
values is the absence of a consistent local level data set on the vacant possession capital
values of stock in the RSL sector. The DETR guidance is based on 1999 valuations of the
sample of council and RSL dwellings that were covered by the 1996 English House
Condition Survey, from which the DETR derive formulae that can be applied to the stock of
individual councils or RSLs. While the DETR guidance is extremely helpful the constraints
of the limited size of the national sample of RSL valuations should be recognized, together
with the need for RSLs to have appropriately defined capital values at current values to apply
the DETR formulae.
The HACAS modelling for DETR used Halifax house price data for dwellings at the bottom
end of the owner occupied sector to create an index of locational variations in capital values
by local authority area. However the initial local level HACAS analyses of capital value rents
covered by the published DETR summary all generated far sharper north-south variations in
values than those reflected in the EHCS valuations of RSL stock. Consequently subsequent
HACAS analyses damped the local level Halifax capital value data so that when applied to
the RSL stock it generated north-south variations more consistent with the EHCS valuations.
Using damped capital values data the HACAS report also shows the potential impact of the
three Green Paper rent policy options in redistributing average RSL rents between regions (at
1998 levels). In all three cases this shows rents rising in London, and reducing in the East
Midlands and the northern regions. The extent of the rises reflect, however, not just the
relative weighting attached to capital values in the three policy options, but also the approach
taken to modelling earnings and running costs.
For example, while the HACAS modelling uses county level earnings data, the DETR
guidance is based on regional earnings data, and while the HACAS modelling uses earnings
data for low earnings across all sectors of the labour market, the DETR guidance uses
average manual earnings data. Similarly while the HACAS modelling applies a flat rate
running costs component nationally, the DETR guidance is based on formulae used in the
local authority housing subsidy system, that differentiates between dwellings of different
types and sizes, and applies weightings for regional cost factors.
Thus while the regional rent changes under the ‘running costs’ option would be lower this is
largely as a result of the flat rate assumption on running costs. If a regionally disaggregated
approach on running costs were to be adopted the impact on average regional rent
differentials would be more like those resulting from the ‘50:50’ capital values and earnings
policy option.
Many northern RSLs are likely to favour a rent policy options that gives as little as possible
emphasis to capital values, and has the least on the current structure of RSL rents. There are,
however, two points that should consider before committing themselves to that approach. The
first is that one of the major problems for many RSLs operating in the north is that their rents
are very close to market levels, and this makes it difficult for them to either attract or retain
economically active tenant households (3).
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The other factor is the link between the degree of convergence required between RSL and
council rents, and the degree of emphasis on capital values in the chosen rent policy. For
England as a whole the average capital value of RSL dwellings is some 20% higher than that
for council dwellings. This is not because RSL dwellings are on average better quality than
council dwellings – differences in quality have only a very limited impact on capital values. It
is because more RSL dwellings are located in the south of England, not least because of the
impact of stock transfers, in locations that have higher capital values. It follows from this that
the greater emphasis on capital values in the adopted rent policy, the lower will be the extent
of the convergence required between average rents in the two sectors, and the shorter the
period that average annual RSL rent increases will be pegged to RPI.
Related issues
It will therefore be critically important not just which rent policy option is chosen in
principle, and how large a component is formed by capital values, but how earnings or
running costs are defined in practice. Other important issues to be resolved relate to the
definition of rents, and, to quote from the DETR guidance – ‘the degree of flexibility for
social landlords to set rents for individual properties within a restructured framework’.
While the DETR guidance is based on net rents, the HACAS modelling is based on RSL
rents inclusive of service charges eligible for housing benefit. Part of the problem here is the
lack of consistency between RSLs on whether they include components of costs, such as
maintenance of common parts and grounds, as part of the net rent, or as a service charge.
Current Housing Corporation rent monitoring is based on rents inclusive of service charges
eligible for housing benefit, not least because if monitoring focused only on net rents this
would be an open invitation to all RSLs to switch a range of costs to service charges.
For RSLs with a substantial proportion of self contained supported and sheltered
accommodation the rent definitions applied have an even greater significance, although this
definitional point should become less of an issue once the new financial regime for support
costs has been introduced. What will be far more important for those RSLs will the combined
impact of rent restructuring and the new financial regime for support costs over the same
period of time.
The issue of the ‘degree of flexibility’ for individual landlords is also important. Currently
the Housing Corporation focuses its concerns on RSLs whose rents are more than 5% above
local averages for the sector. If a similar degree of flexibility is permitted under the new
regime it will significantly ease the process of adjustment for RSLs, relative to a policy
requiring a greater measure of conformity.
A final element in the rent policy proposals set out in the green paper is that, for individual
tenants, and rent increases or decreases related to restructuring will be limited to £2 per week
each year. While it appears from the green paper that these phasing limits would apply after
taking account of annual RPI increases, the details of how this element of policy is to be
operationalised also remains to be determined. For most RSLs these phasing limits would see
compliance with the new rent policies achieved within a ten year period, and in many cases
over a far shorter period. The bigger question for many RSLs is whether they can comply
with the new rent policy requirements, at the same time as remaining viable, and complying
with the requirements of private funders.
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There are important debates to conclude about the moves towards a more coherent rent policy
for the council and RSL sectors. These raise particularly acute issues for the RSL sector,
because they are being asked to adjust to the new regime without the ‘financial parachute’
that the housing subsidy system provides to the councils that will be required to reduce their
rents under the new policy framework. If, however, those debates are to be fully informed
there needs to be just as much emphasis on data, definitions and implementation, as on first
principles.
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7. Subsidy Implications of the Green Paper
John Hills, CASE, London School of Economics
The way in which subsidies would have to be adapted to meet the Government’s aims,
particularly for rents, is something of a missing chapter in the Green Paper. This is
particularly important given the limits of what existing instruments can achieve.
At the most straightforward end there are three areas which can be achieved:
• For local authority HRAs as a whole, DETR can simply substitute any new rent system
for the existing rent guidelines, and HRA subsidy will adjust.
• For transfers, new rent guidelines can be built into the transfer terms, so the new landlord
can move towards a consistent level.
• For new housing association developments, capital grants can be set to be compatible
with the same structure.
A rather harder issue is how such rent guidelines will relate to the current system of rent caps
for local authorities. Will they be consistent but higher, giving authorities some discretion, or
will they be the same, so that the guideline becomes an upper limit too? Another issue which
is unclear at the moment is how rent caps will be achieved once rent rebate subsidy is taken
out of the system.
What becomes harder is how the rent system will relate to housing association rent caps, and
how associations will be compensated if the rent guideline is below the existing rent, and the
income generated does not cover ‘reasonable’ costs. This gives a choice between:
a) A capital buyout – in effect retrospective social housing grant.
b) Future recurrent subsidies. But if so, how would they be calculated, and would this
defeat the object of another part of policy, to get social landlords to be financially
independent?
It should be noted that if the rent option chosen is not related to running costs, it becomes
almost inevitable that there has be some kind of recurrent subsidy/claw-back as incomes can
then easily diverge from costs. A further key issue is obviously how ‘surpluses’ can be
removed (if they can) from associations with rent guidelines above current rents. It is not
clear how this can be achieved with current instruments.
All of this relates to rent guidelines at the level of the whole landlord. However, in several
places the Green Paper talks as if the Government’s intention is to set individual rents. Is this
really the case? If so how can this be achieved – persuasion, inspection, or penalties? More
generally if policy intends to achieve particular rents, this implies an end to the general idea
that, while subsidy could support target rents, rents in practice would vary up and down
depending on landlord efficiency.
There are some other wider unanswered subsidy issues in the Green Paper. Three worth
considering in more detail are:
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• Arms length management companies. The conditions set for these imply that these will
depend on quality of management, not subsidy position. However, if they are still
receiving variable HRA subsidy it is hard to see how they can really be at ‘arms length’
if, for instance, new borrowing increases capital subsidy entitlement. To avoid this they
could have their capital finances restructured (as in a transfer) or remain entitled to a
fixed flow of future subsidy.
• Wider activities. Debate is moving towards the advantages of social landlords
diversifying in some areas to create more mixed communities, for instance through
market renting or equity sharing of existing stocks. This could generate resources for
buying property elsewhere or for catch-up repairs. However, the subsidy implications
need to be thought through carefully – for instance to avoid this simply relaxing
efficiency pressures.
• Cost formulae. If policy does move towards tighter constraints on rents, even at an
individual level, the way costs are allowed for will become even more important.
Compared with the NHS, the evidence base for calculating what management and
maintenance allowances should be is very weak. One implication of the Green Paper may
be that more refinement is needed of such allowances.
Key points from the discussion on social housing rents and subsidies
• While it is possible to read the Green Paper as indicating that the policy will be concerned
with setting the rents of individual properties, it is average rents that are the primary
interest.
• There are limited levers available to ensure that the government’s objectives with respect
to rent restructuring are realised. The HIP system offers some levers to encourage LAs,
but these will be reduced with the move to a single capital pot.
• Government can move money around the subsidy system to protect those in some parts of
the country but in high capital value areas authorities are recognising that they may lose if
they stay as LAs. But if they transfer to the RSL sector then any rent surpluses generated
are more difficult to claw back.
• Are ALMCs an irrelevance? They are seen as a starting point and in the longer term, if
current plans to restructure capital financing come to fruition, then ALMCs will be in a
relatively strong position.
• How with the financial system work with respect to ALMCs? In the short term there will
be an extra element added to the authorities’ subsidy calculation to allow them to borrow
privately.
• It is recognised that while the new rent systems will not be about setting the rents on
individual dwellings it will effectively break the rent-efficiency trade-off.
• There have been suggestions that the RPI+1% formula for RSL rent increases will be
reinstated once convergence has occurred. But if RPI+0 is seen as part of a broader
efficiency agenda then this is unlikely to be the case.
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• If we work with any system of rent caps and allowances for management costs then it is
clear that the less efficient RSLs will struggle. The question is how to deal with this. The
Housing Corporation has a monitoring and cajoling role and it is already showing the how
it could run the rent regime. Those RSLs that genuinely cannot live with the RPI+1% or
RPI+0 will be allowed to set rents outside that constraint, but only after a thorough going
over by the Housing Corporation.
• RSL viability is a knotty problem which seems to be driving the whole system. Is the
right starting point from which to establish an appropriate system?
• Current LA rent structures make sense regionally and RSL structures make sense locally,
but will moving to any of the new rent options give you the worst of both worlds? Current
LA structures are steeper than those that would be generated by any of the options in the
Green Paper. They mainly embody differentials between large and small dwellings which
mean that they are coherent within the stock, but don’t include location. Most
fundamentally, are we sure that capital values are the right basis for social rent setting?
• The issue of including location in rent is the most contentious. Some authorities do not
want to see location as a factor in their rents, but are keen that rents differ between
estates!! It is clear that a capital value based system in boroughs with very different local
housing sub-markets can generate 1 bed properties at one end of the borough with higher
rents than 4 bed properties at the other. This must raise questions about sustainable
communities and the conflict between rent policy and policies around mixed
communities. In this debate it is important to ensure that objectives link across between
the Urban White Paper and the Housing Green Paper. There are a range of possible
options and all involve some form of damping, but how far do you go down the ‘people
should pay for what they receive’ route before you create ghettos? Alternatively, should
social tenants live in Mayfair? It’s an old question, but one that remains unresolved.
• Given the multiple goals of social housing, is a single spine running through rent policy
possible? Can a single system deliver regional and local equity, market-like incentives
and mixed, sustainable communities?
• Whichever rent setting options was selected there is likely to be ‘a good chunk’ of local
discretion within the system.
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8. Concluding discussion
The following points were made during the concluding discussion:
• The Green Paper is perhaps not fully comprehensive but it attempts to pull everything
together in one document and exhibit joined up thinking. It does not have all the answers
and is willing to acknowledge the problems – this is one of its strengths.
• In the 1980s there were a string of high profile initiatives and less scope to think more
broadly. The Green Paper is seen as part of the broader thinking that is now possible.
• For a while it has been clear that there is no ‘national’ housing policy – the low demand
issue illustrates that – so how are policy makers going to cope?
• The Green Paper indicates that local authorities continue to have a role in the housing
system which is perhaps contrary to what some had anticipated. While that role is
primarily strategic, it does not mean that there isn’t a need for social housing.
• On some topics – such as the reform of Housing Benefit – there was some disappointment
at the timidity of proposed change. The government could have tried harder.
• In the private rented sector the Green Paper perhaps focuses too much upon the large
landlords/investors and forgets the small.
• More broadly, when thinking about the future of the owner occupied sector it is perhaps
more important to think in terms of access to decent quality homes and choices about
where to live, rather than simply about tenure.
• It is imperative that the government recognises that existing proposals for low income
home ownership are fundamentally flawed and inadequate (see discussion in section 1
above).
